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The Split Personality of Prudence 
in the Unfolding Political Economy of New Labour 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In New Labour’s hands, the concept of prudence has been used politically as part of 
the attempt to differentiate the current Government with its Party predecessors.  
According to this account of modern British economic history, all other Labour 
Governments have come into office overburdened by spending commitments out of 
all proportion to the fiscal health of the nation.  By continuing to act upon such 
commitments, they were guilty of behaving ‘imprudently’, and the payback came in 
the form of electorally inexpedient austerity measures enforced by international 
currency markets in the second half of their terms.  By contrast, New Labour stressed 
its commitment to running a tight budgetary ship whilst still in opposition, so as to 
avoid a punitive response from international currency markets when in government 
and thus protect its political momentum at the approach of the next election. 
New Labour’s narrative of the medium-term politics of prudence has also been 
internalised in the academic literature and, as a consequence, it has become the 
standard account.  Less concern has been expressed for understanding prudence in 
economic terms.  Specifically, no attention has been paid at all to the unfolding 
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relationship between the two distinct economic definitions of the concept which have 
struggled for pre-eminence at various stages in the evolution of the political economy 
of New Labour. 
The first of these definitions Gordon Brown was happy to take from his Chief 
Economic Advisor of the time, Ed Balls.  It relates to a particular element of modern 
macroeconomic theory – the so-called ‘time consistency problem’ – and it defined the 
political economy of New Labour from the days of opposition all the way through its 
first term.  I review this first aspect of Brown’s ‘prudence’ in section one.  It involves 
the Government’s conscious manipulation of financial market expectations as a means 
of creating additional policy-making autonomy in the face of potentially ‘corrective’ 
movements in financial prices.  The objective is to pass market tests of counter-
inflationary credibility by demonstrating a budgetary policy which is capable of 
holding national debt in check. 
The second of Brown’s economic definitions of prudence is much more his 
own, being drawn from the work of his great intellectual hero, Adam Smith.  It relates 
to particular types of microeconomic intervention, and it has come ever more to 
define the political economy of New Labour beyond the end of its first term in 
government.  Smith believed that the inculcation of prudent habits instilled in 
individuals a microeconomic subjectivity suited to fostering a dynamic capitalist 
economy.  It involves encouraging individuals to save, at which point an aggregate 
stock of savings can be released in order to assist the process of capital accumulation.  
The Treasury under Brown has also been a strong advocate of institutionalising the 
savings habit, in particular amongst sections of the population who were previously 
non-savers.  There are certainly good reasons for acting in such a way, with the Office 
for National Statistics reporting in June 2008 that British households in total now owe 
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a higher proportion of their income in debt than has been the case for any other 
advanced economy at any point in history.1
Section three takes me to the crux of my argument.  I suggest that there is a 
distinct chronology to Brown’s appeal to the two economic definitions of prudence.  
The microeconomic definition (following Smith) has come to prominence only 
latterly during New Labour’s time in office, following a substantial increase in public 
expenditure between 2002 and 2005.  Before that, almost all emphasis was placed on 
the macroeconomic definition (following the time consistency problem).  In many 
ways the turn to Smith’s ideas has been used to try to paper over the cracks of the 
growing imprudence – as judged by the way in which New Labour previously used 
the concept – of the Government’s own spending plans.  Society has been asked to 
accept the burden of saving in a context in which the state is increasingly reluctant to 
do so. 
 
None of this means that New Labour is necessarily wrong in its attempts to 
stimulate higher rates of saving within society.  Given record levels of household 
debt, the opposite is almost certainly the case.  In the absence of concerted efforts to 
facilitate a more widespread culture of savings, Government inaction might have 
increased the level of state reliance in the event that current debt burdens begin to 
unwind.  My argument is consequently much more modest than an outright 
denunciation of Government savings policy.  It is merely to point to the irony of the 
context in which the savings habit has been exhorted.  Smith was adamant that trying 
to create within the population a dominant microeconomic subjectivity centred on the 
savings habit would be futile if the Government showed no restraint in its own 
spending plans.  Yet, this is exactly what has happened in the unfolding political 
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economy of New Labour.  The Smithian appeal to microeconomic prudence therefore 
rests uneasily within the noticeably un-Smithian context in which it has been enacted. 
 
 
2. Macroeconomic Prudence 
 
It is necessary simultaneously to keep three different focal points in mind in order to 
understand the original introduction of the concept of prudence into the political 
economy of New Labour.  The first relates to the personal influences through which 
Gordon Brown came to espouse the concept (i.e., from whom did he learn the 
significance of thinking in such a way?); the second relates to the broader climate of 
opinion in which the concept took on the guise of common-sense (i.e., which body of 
academic literature encourages the internalisation of such habits of thought?); the 
third relates to the specific political purpose of the Labour Party in adopting the 
concept (i.e., why was Brown of a mind to treat the concept as his own?).  Whilst 
these are ostensibly three separate questions, they are integrally interwoven into a 
single political story. 
Starting with the personal influences which lay at the heart of this story, it is 
clear that the primary focus should be on Ed Balls, now a member of Brown’s Cabinet 
as Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, but formerly his Chief 
Economic Advisor.  In the earlier period he became, in effect, a veto player in the 
struggle for influence on Brown’s thinking.  From 1994, when he was first used in an 
advisory capacity, policies were increasingly only likely to be adopted by Brown if 
they met designs for fiscal propriety commensurable with the perceived wishes of 
investors of mobile capital operating within international financial markets.  Yet this 
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in itself was only ever a thinly veiled mask for whether or not they received Balls’s 
personal seal of approval. 
Balls’s job as leader writer for The Financial Times had led him to develop 
many important contacts in the City of London, and from the soundings of these 
people he became convinced that Labour had to decide whether its priority was 
simply to win the election due some time in the five years following 1992 or to 
govern successfully once elected with a view to ensuring re-election.  If the decision 
was the former then it could allow its economic policy to evolve in iterative fashion 
from the foundation on which it fought and lost the 1992 election.  If the latter, 
however, it needed to develop a brand new framework of thinking appropriate to 
institutionalising the kind of counter-inflationary anchor which Britain had lacked 
through all the failed experiments with corporatism in the late 1970s, monetarism in 
the early 1980s, Deutschmark shadowing in the late 1980s and the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism in the early 1990s.  Balls invited Brown to share his 
enthusiasm for a decisive rupture, as opposed to incremental change, in Labour Party 
thinking on matters of economic policy.2
Balls has latterly revealed the extent to which his own views on the subject 
were shaped decisively by contributions to the theory of macroeconomic policy-
making condensed in a period of rapid theoretical advancement in the two decades 
from the mid 1970s.
 
3  He believed that the theory itself held the key to solving 
Labour’s problems.  On this point he found a willing audience in Brown, because 
Balls’s account of the theory chimed directly with Brown’s attempts to depict New 
Labour as less threatening than the Party had previously seemed to the economic 
aspirations of Britain’s middle classes.  At this time, New Labour’s leaders relied 
heavily on focus group findings of middle-class antipathy to any kind of active tax-
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and-spend agendas in their definition of Party priorities.4
The macroeconomic theory which informed Balls’s thinking is written in the 
tradition of Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott’s time consistency problem.  Such 
writing depicts two potential paths for government policy.  On the one hand, the 
government might have gained a reputation for imprudent macroeconomic policy-
making, whereby the expectation takes hold amongst all economic agents that it 
cannot be trusted to act as diligently as it talks in support of a low-tax, low-spend 
agenda.  All economic agents will therefore adjust their expectations to a higher-tax, 
higher-spend agenda irrespective of what the government actually announces, and in 
that move alone they will impart a higher inflationary trajectory onto the economy 
and consequently undermine the government’s social programme.  On the other hand, 
the government might have gained a reputation for prudent macroeconomic policy-
making, whereby it will not be blown off course by economic agents’ assumptions 
that it will subsequently follow a more expansionary policy than the one it originally 
announced.  In this way it will gain the assent of the financial markets for pursuing its 
social programme.
  The initial political purpose 
of prudence was therefore to create a policy which articulated directly the perceived 
interests of potential floating voters amongst the middle classes, whilst 
simultaneously nullifying the threat of a financial market backlash against its plans. 
5
The theory supposes that the short-cut to such a favourable reputation lies in 
the creation of institutional lock-ins which demonstrate, by their very presence, that 
no alternatives are possible to the pre-announced policy.  The decision to grant 
operational independence on interest rate settings to the Bank of England should be 
considered in this light, as should Brown’s constant reiteration of strict fiscal rules 
designed to limit expectations of spending increases.  The former creates a formal 
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apparatus which, from the government’s perspective, runs policy on automatic pilot, 
whilst the latter was intended to show that budgetary control was at least locked-into 
Brown’s mind. 
There is a single intellectual move in the theory which makes it suitable as a 
means of simultaneously articulating both New Labour’s political and its economic 
priorities.  This is the treatment of inflation as a de facto tax on consumption 
possibilities.  A consequentialist logic is offered in justification of such a move.  
Taxes lead to a direct loss of purchasing power at any given level of wealth, and 
inflation can be inferred to have an analogous effect through its impact on general 
product prices.  From this perspective, inflation can be thought of as an implicit 
wealth tax, and New Labour did much in opposition to instil the sense in Britain’s 
middle classes that they would be subjected to no new wealth tax of this nature, just 
as surely as they would be subjected to no new direct taxes.  The macroeconomic 
understanding of prudence was therefore strategically aligned to perceptions of 
middle-class interests: every time the ostensibly technical language of the time 
consistency problem was used it was a direct appeal to the politics of accommodating 
the policy preferences associated with middle-class interests. 
The academic literature on macroeconomic theory suggests that governments 
have a much better chance of being successful policy-makers if their ‘credibility’ is 
not in doubt.  Yet, when proclaiming their own prudential virtues, such credibility has 
a very narrow meaning.  Economically it is restricted to meeting nothing other than 
inflation targets, so the previously presumed trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment is replaced by a singular focus on inflation.  Politically it restricts the 
terrain of feasible electoral strategies solely to the struggle for middle-class support 
for the party’s tax-and-spend approach.  The government enjoys gains to its counter-
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inflationary credibility in direct proportion to the size of the adverse effects on its 
social programme it is willing to ignore in order to preserve the integrity of its 
inflation commitments.  The route to a reputation for prudent management of the 
economy certainly passes through talking tough about inflation, but it is whether or 
not the government is prepared to act tough which matters most.  The key to 
understanding New Labour’s macroeconomic understanding of prudence lies in its 
initially radical embrace of governance structures which deny the very logic of 
alternative forms of action.  Such a realisation has invited any number of different 
characterisations of New Labour’s macroeconomics, perhaps the unkindest of which 
is that it bettered the performance of all previous Labour Governments by betraying 
its core working class constituencies even before getting into office.  Rather less 
pejorative characterisations focus on New Labour’s willingness to position itself 
within a basically Thatcherite political settlement, thus endorsing many of the tenets 
of neoliberalism.6
 
 
 
3. Microeconomic Prudence 
 
Much of the story of the preceding section will already be well known to those who 
read the academic literature on the subject.  Whilst the details of the link to recent 
developments in macroeconomic theory are only infrequently revealed, there are few 
surprises in the suggestion that New Labour adopted a placatory stance with respect to 
the financial markets, or in the suggestion that this also served to further embed 
middle-class interests in the prevailing tax-and-spend agenda.  What has not been 
adequately appreciated so far, however, is that there has been a second, entirely 
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different conception of prudence which has been increasingly evident in policy as 
New Labour entered its second and now third terms of government. 
The accounts of the journalists who have enjoyed prime access to Gordon 
Brown during his time as both Shadow Chancellor and Chancellor suggest that the 
attempt to run macroeconomic policy on a series of automatic pilots fits well with his 
personal view that macroeconomics is in any case less important than 
microeconomics.  The second conception of prudence in evidence in Brown’s 
management of the economy focuses on the microeconomic imperative of changing 
individual behavioural traits.  It is taken from the work of Brown’s declared favourite 
political economist and fellow son of Kirkcaldy, Adam Smith.  This is an influence 
which Brown kept almost entirely to himself during the first term heyday of the 
macroeconomic understanding of prudence, but which he has come to assert 
increasingly insistently during the second and third terms of government. 
Smith’s outline of the concept of prudence features more prominently in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments than it does in The Wealth of Nations, but even there it is 
inscribed with important economic content.  It describes one of his four principal 
virtues – the others being justice, beneficence and self-command7 – and out of the 
four it is the one which is most obviously oriented to the self.  Acting prudently in 
Smith’s formulation allowed every person, who in any case “is first and principally 
recommended to his own care”, to ‘better their own condition’.8
Smith worked with a dual conception of self-interest, much in the manner of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s distinction between ‘amour de soi’ (literally, love of 
oneself) and ‘amour-propre’ (self-love).  The latter, amour-propre, had socially 
  But this does not 
mean that Smithian prudence is as self-serving as would be the case if it were simply 
an anticipation of today’s notion of an intrinsically selfish homo economicus. 
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disintegrative capacities which Smith associated with excessive vanity, leading the 
individual to treat other people’s interests as entirely dispensable if they did not also 
serve their own.  The truly prudent individual aims only to satisfy the former, amour 
de soi, whereby taking care of the self involves initially honing one’s own survivalist 
instincts and latterly helping to design the social institutions to guarantee everyone 
else’s survival.  Brown’s increasing articulation of this, rather than the more nakedly 
self-serving, type of self-interest appears to be less intrinsically Thatcherite than the 
accommodation of middle-class interests in a basically neoliberal tax-and-spend 
agenda.  At the very least, the microeconomic variant of prudence seems at first 
glance to invite fewer perfunctory comparisons between New Labour and its 
Thatcherite inheritance than does the macroeconomic variant. 
Smithian prudence translates economically into encouragement for the 
individual to refrain from myopic current consumption and to prioritise saving 
instead.  He believed that the wealth of the nation depended primarily on the 
proportion of employees who were engaged in productive as against non-productive 
labour.9  This in turn depended on money being taken out of circulation and turned 
into invested capital: the number of workers employed productively varies directly 
with the amount of capital invested from private hands.10
In the words of Edwin Cannan – a late nineteenth/early twentieth century 
editor of Smith’s work who Giancarlo de Vivo describes as a ‘loyal devotee’ – 
throughout The Wealth of Nations Smith “treats prodigality with bourgeois contempt; 
  According to Smith, the 
prudent individual is the one who seeks to release capital into the productive 
economy.  This ensures their own survival as they reap the rewards of the 
accumulation process; furthermore, the employment of productive labour creates a 
social institution capable of ensuring other people’s survival. 
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it is a kind of mental aberration; sane men save”.11  Smith himself called upon 
everyone of however modest means to invest with an eye to the future, whereby “the 
magnificence of the person whose expence had been chiefly in durable commodities, 
would be continually increasing, every day’s expence contributing something to 
support and heighten the effect of that of the following day”.  He contrasted this with 
the situation of a person who consumes so conspicuously that there is nothing left of 
current income for more prudential expenditures.  “No trace or vestige of the expence 
of the latter would remain, and the effects of ten or twenty years profusion would be 
as completely annihilated as if they had never existed.” 12
Under Brown, the Treasury also developed a number of new initiatives aimed 
at facilitating saving.  The most immediate cause of such policies was growing 
concern over the size of household indebtedness, as much of the dynamism of the 
British economy over New Labour’s first two terms was driven by credit-based 
consumption.  Yet, it also had a more strategic dimension.  New Labour has attempted 
to reconfigure the underlying model of welfare provision in Britain, giving much 
more prominence than ever before to linking that provision to the individual 
ownership of assets.  Within such a system, the government uses tax breaks as fiscal 
incentives for individuals to build up their asset-based wealth.  The payback comes in 
the gradual withdrawal of state-sponsored welfare programmes, with individuals 
being required to make up the shortfall in welfare expenditure by cashing in their 
accumulated assets and using the money thus created to purchase their own services. 
  Faced with such a choice, 
and even before beginning to consider the possible link to the national economic 
interest, the rational individual in Smith’s construction would indeed appear to have a 
preference for saving, as Cannan suggests. 
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The individual who is fully incorporated into New Labour’s asset-based 
system of welfare exhibits Smithian prudence in both of its senses.  On the one hand, 
the move to an asset-based system of welfare has been prefigured by explicit public 
recognition on the part of the Government that the state pension will become 
increasingly incapable of sustaining people in old age.  Constructing a personal 
portfolio of assets in the medium-term is therefore consistent with a Rousseauian 
amour de soi, because it provides a means of satisfying one’s long-term care needs.  
On the other hand, the individual who has invested soundly for the future is removed 
as a potential burden on residual government expenditures.  This allows extra money 
to be made available to meet the Treasury’s aim of fine-tuning the fiscal incentive 
structure so that it is targeted primarily at those who are currently asset-poor.13
The most important intermediary points in this process pass through the 
realms of work and saving.  In order to have the opportunity to build up a portfolio of 
assets in the first place one needs income, and income is typically generated via active 
participation on the labour market.  Through programmes such as the New Deal and 
Working Tax Credits, the Treasury under Brown linked receipt of welfare to 
reintegration into the labour market and tried to ensure that people would not be 
penalised financially by moving off benefits back into work.  To subsequently make 
the most of the resulting opportunity to build up a portfolio of assets one needs to be 
convinced of the merits of saving.  To this end the Treasury has undertaken a 
concerted financial literacy drive in order to facilitate a savings culture, backing this 
with initiatives such as the Saving Gateway, which promises to match the money put 
aside by new savers with an equal amount from the public purse. 
  The 
Government hopes that this will assist in the construction of the social institutions 
necessary to ensure everyone’s survival in a world of asset-based welfare. 
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This is all about changing individuals’ behavioural traits, using incentives 
strategically to turn them into the desired form of economic agent.  The model person 
the Government has in mind is the active worker-saver-investor, a person who knows 
instinctively not only to withhold a proportion of their labour market rewards from 
current consumption but also to use the resulting flow of funds to become the owner 
of high-performing assets.  Alan Finlayson has described the attempt to reconstitute 
the economic subjectivities of ordinary people as an example of modern-day “social 
democratic paternalism”,14
 
 and such a characterisation appears apt.  Interestingly, its 
content converges closely with Smith’s conception of prudence. 
 
4. Linking Macroeconomic to Microeconomic Prudence 
 
From the above it is evident that we are faced with two completely different 
understandings of prudence when appraising the political economy of New Labour, 
one macroeconomic and the other microeconomic.  The most interesting question 
which remains is whether or not there is an intrinsic relationship between these two 
different understandings. 
One way in which to investigate such a possibility is as a matter of simple 
chronology, for it is clear that there has been a shift in the relative significance of the 
two in public pronouncements of New Labour’s policy priorities.  The early period of 
New Labour – which we can date to the three years in opposition following the 
election of Tony Blair as Party leader in 1994, plus the whole of the first term in 
government – saw the dominance of the macroeconomic understanding of prudence.  
Without apparent exception, every time Brown made reference to his prudential aims 
 15 
it was in the sense of him striving to gain a reputation for strict counter-inflationary 
control for both the Party and the Government.  Certainly his most headline-grabbing 
decisions in this period both fit such a pattern.  The first was the announcement before 
the election that the Party had no intention of revising the incumbent Conservative 
Government’s pre-set expenditure plans, even though they represented a deliberate 
under-estimation of what needed to be spent to maintain existing social programmes 
in their current form.  The second was the announcement in the first week in office 
that the Government would hand over responsibility for interest rate settings to the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. 
The later period of New Labour – which we can date to its second and third 
terms in government – appears to imply something quite different.  There is nothing 
as decisive as a single moment in which Brown switched from using the 
macroeconomic to the microeconomic understanding of prudence.  But it is 
nevertheless apparent, from today’s position mid-way through the third term, that he 
is now most likely to appeal to prudence in the Smithian sense of encouraging the 
character traits of the active worker-saver-investor.  Something seems to have 
happened in the second term, as a result of which the Smithian conception of 
prudence gradually began to displace the time consistency conception.  This was 
contemporaneous with Brown’s increasingly conspicuous Prime-Minister-in-Waiting 
phase, in which he paid more and more attention to outlining his vision for the 
country’s future.  The Kirkcaldy connection between himself and Adam Smith was 
increasingly cited as an intellectual influence during this phase. 
Suggestive as it might be in its own terms, this chronological account also 
reveals something much more significant politically.  The shift from a 
macroeconomic to a microeconomic understanding of prudence is not simply a 
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reflection of changing priorities for the Government.  It represents, as much as 
anything, the response to new economic conditions of which New Labour was itself 
the instigator.  William Keegan has provided the most authoritative journalistic 
account of Brown’s years at the Treasury set against the unfolding political raison 
d’être of strict counter-inflationary control.  The macroeconomic theory based on the 
time consistency problem treats the search for counter-inflationary credibility as 
something approaching an end in itself.15  By contrast, Brown would most often cite 
the merits of macroeconomic prudence in its own terms before then talking about 
‘prudence for a purpose’.  For Keegan, the Balls connection is once again central in 
this respect.  The attraction of modern macroeconomic theory for Balls was that, once 
established, the credibility that the theory held so dear would enable New Labour to 
activate enhanced social expenditure programmes with the implied consent of the 
financial markets.16
It is noticeable that the timing of the transition period from the 
macroeconomic to the microeconomic understanding of prudence directly coincides 
with the timing of significant increases in public spending on the frontline welfare 
services in health and education.  The figures make for interesting reading.  During 
the first term, when the macroeconomic understanding was at its height, the growth of 
public spending as a whole averaged just 1.7% per year.
 
17  This was not only lower 
than for any previous Labour Government and lower than for its immediate 
Conservative predecessor.  It was also below the average annual rates of both 
economic growth and general price inflation for the same four-year period, meaning 
that on two separate measures it was outright contractionary in real economic terms.  
Public sector capital investment, so vital for maintaining the infrastructure for 
frontline welfare services, averaged only 0.6% of GDP between 1997 and 2001.  This 
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was less than for any comparable four-year period of government in the whole history 
of modern British politics. 
Yet, by 2003, Brown’s fiscal rules concerning the conduct of government 
expenditure had been breached – and quite spectacularly so – amidst a plethora of 
new spending pledges in the areas of health and education.  The current budget 
position in Labour’s first year in power, 1997-1998, was a deficit of £1.2 billion at 
2006-2007 prices.  That position improved to surpluses of £25 and £27.5 billion in 
1999-2000 and 2000-2001, before subsequently declining to deficits of £18.8 and 
£19.9 billion in 2003-2004 and 2004-2005.  This represents a turnaround on the 
surplus on the current budget equivalent to 3.6% of GDP between 1999-2000 and 
2004-2005.  The accumulated net debt was £352.9 billion in 1997-1998, falling to 
£312.4 billion in 2000-2001, before rising to £499.5 billion in 2006-2007.18
The shift from the macroeconomic to the microeconomic understanding of 
prudence has its origins in these new fiscal realities.  Given the favourable economic 
conditions that Brown inherited when becoming Chancellor, the fiscal position was 
always likely to look strong by the end of New Labour’s first term.  Even so, the strict 
obedience to credibility concerns initially displayed by New Labour enabled it to 
emphasise that strength and to pay off a substantial proportion of the short-term 
national debt.
  From 
these figures we are left to conclude that the gamekeeper, in effect, had turned 
poacher. 
19  The turnaround in public spending since that time has been financed 
largely through new issues of medium-term debt.  On its own this would have been 
likely to threaten the future stability of the fiscal position.  But coupled with the 
increasingly explicit acknowledgement of the potential for substantial future pension 
shortfalls, the trend from the second term onwards has been very much in the opposite 
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direction to macroeconomic prudence.  The shift towards the microeconomic 
understanding of prudence in part reflect the fact that the macroeconomic story of 
prudence is no longer so believable, although in part it also reflects the content of the 
Government’s strategy to combat the growing gap in its fiscal position. 
Whilst the immediate burden of the extra spending has fallen first on the 
public purse, New Labour proposes to lessen its long-term effects through facilitating 
behavioural change at the individual level.  The aim is to dissipate the long-term 
burden of the extra spending by requiring people to become more self-reliant when 
planning how best to satisfy their consumption needs in old age.  The move to an 
asset-based system of welfare reconfigures the role of the state.  Whilst residual state 
provision is always likely to be necessary for those who remain excluded from asset 
ownership, the role of the state becomes not one simply of service provider.  In 
addition, it also needs to be actively involved in creating the conditions for individuals 
to begin to both think and act instinctively as savers.  For Brown, the sphere of 
desirable economic interventions has increasingly been restricted to only those 
attempts as are consistent with New Labour’s ideal image of individual economic 
subjectivity. 
Such a person displays a high degree of personal economic autonomy at every 
stage of the life cycle, treating dependency on the wage labour process as a 
complement to that autonomy, but dependency on the state as an affront to it.  The 
work ethic is to be deliberately encouraged as a means of providing the basis of 
personal autonomy, and individuals must be encouraged to accept responsibility for 
meeting their own future consumption needs.  The ideal image of individual economic 
subjectivity therefore conforms very much to the Smithian conception of prudence 
outlined in the previous section.  At heart, though, New Labour’s growing preference 
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for constituting an economy of such people is itself recognition of the increasing 
failure of its macroeconomic prudence.  The Government is increasingly asking 
individuals to fill the breach by making up for shortfalls in state saving with personal 
saving. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is much to gain by looking at ‘prudence’ as a distinctly two-sided phenomenon 
in the political economy of New Labour.  It allows us to say much more than simply 
that the concept has been significant – which it surely has – in helping the Party to 
project its understanding of economic priorities into British political debates.  
Reviewing the shift from a macroeconomic (time consistency) to a microeconomic 
(Smithian) definition of prudence also enables us to demonstrate, in substantive terms, 
how those priorities have changed.  It offers a means of providing a chronology of 
such changes.  Importantly, it also shows how the two conceptions are causally 
related, as one element of the political economy of New Labour unravelled during the 
second term and, in the process, created the necessity of its own replacement. 
There is one final twist in the tale, which suggests that the split personality of 
prudence might actually prove to be a double-edged sword for New Labour.  The 
transition between the macroeconomic and the microeconomic understanding of 
prudence took place without any outwardly apparent process of political struggle in 
the Labour Party, suggesting that from the Party’s perspective the latter acts very 
much as a substitute for the former.  However, if we look at the provenance of the 
ideas which underpin the microeconomic understanding, a different conclusion arises. 
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The microeconomic understanding has definite Smithian undertones, but 
Smith himself was adamant that the principles of personal prudence applied every bit 
as much to the state.  When asked by the-then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles 
Townshend, for his advice on how best to wind down the public debt, he willingly 
gave it.  He was, at the very least, the partial architect of a recalibration of the 
‘Sinking Fund’, changes which Townshend introduced in 1767 as a means of 
balancing the borrowing necessary during war-time with accelerating surpluses during 
peace-time.20  In his written work, Smith warned against the state acting as 
“improvident spendthrift”, suggesting that, once set on such a course, “when the 
wisest government has exhausted all the proper subjects of taxation, it must, in cases 
of urgent necessity, have recourse to improper ones”.  He believed that a state 
persistently spending beyond its immediate needs impacted adversely on both the 
lives and the habits of thought of its citizens: “[W]ithout any advantage to the publick, 
[such spending] extends the calamity to a great number of other innocent people.  It 
occasions a general and most pernicious subversion of the fortunes of private people; 
enriching in most cases the idle and profuse debtor at the expence of the industrious 
and frugal creditor, and transporting a great part of the national capital from the hands 
which were likely to increase and improve it, to those which are likely to dissipate and 
destroy it”.21
For Smith, the savings culture has its most profound impact at the level of 
individual economic subjectivity only when the state is both advocate of and adherent 
to that same culture.  New Labour’s own articulation of the need for time consistent 
policies and overall policy-making credibility suggests that a profligate government 
runs the risk of injecting new inflationary tendencies into the economy.  However, an 
inflation-prone economy reduces the incentives to save and makes much more 
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difficult the development of a savings culture.  As such, the successful enactment of 
the microeconomic understanding of prudence appears to be dependent on the 
successful enactment of the macroeconomic understanding.  From a Smithian 
perspective at least, it is not merely a substitute for it.  By increasingly acting as if it 
was, a tension therefore looks as though it has been introduced into the political 
economy of New Labour.  The split personality of its central concept of prudence, 
allied to New Labour’s particular deployment of the second meaning of the concept as 
a masking agent for fault-lines in the first, lies at the heart of the tension.  It is one of 
the Government’s own making. 
The current Conservative Opposition has made much of the claim that the 
credit crunch has exposed weaknesses in the Government’s approach to the budget 
position.  It is accused of not having put enough money aside when the economy was 
unencumbered by exogenous shocks in order to fund later counter-cyclical spending.  
A case can certainly be made that Brown’s fiscal rules inadvertently countenanced a 
short-term approach to budgetary balance at the expense of the stated goal of long-
term budgetary stability.  Yet, this is not my main argument here, as I have attempted 
merely to outline the distinct intellectual provenance of New Labour’s simultaneous 
accounts of economic prudence rather than to engage in a more thoroughgoing 
critique of its economic policy. 
I have been concerned mainly with the way in which the Government has 
changed the ideational basis of its economic strategy in an attempt to ease the pressure 
on its budget position.  As a consequence of this shift, the responsibility to save has 
increasingly been delegated from the state to society.  If such a policy is successful, it 
will render increasingly secondary the question of the relationship between short-term 
budgetary balance and long-term budgetary stability, because the latter condition will 
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be approached in the future via the savings of individuals not the state.  With 
household debt in aggregate running at 173% of income in June 2008 – the highest 
figure ever recorded anywhere – there is an obvious reason for the Government’s 
interest in initiating a more robust savings culture.  However, the timing of its 
conversion to the microeconomic understanding of prudence shows that it only 
switched policy priority once it had recognised that its fiscal rules had already failed. 
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